The off-balance sheet banking risk of large U.S. commercial banks by Hassan, M. Kabir
University of New Orleans 
ScholarWorks@UNO 
Department of Economics and Finance Working 
Papers, 1991-2006 Department of Economics and Finance 
1991 
The off-balance sheet banking risk of large U.S. commercial 
banks 
M. Kabir Hassan 
University of New Orleans 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/econ_wp 
Recommended Citation 
Hassan, M. Kabir, "The off-balance sheet banking risk of large U.S. commercial banks" (1991). 
Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers, 1991-2006. Paper 58. 
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/econ_wp/58 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics and Finance at 
ScholarWorks@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers, 
1991-2006 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@uno.edu. 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS
 
The Off-Balance Sheet Banking Risk 
of Large U.S. Commercial Banks 
M. Kabir Hassan*
 
Working Paper # 6-91
 
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES
 
Department of
 
Economics and Finance
 
University of New Orleans
 
The Off-Balance Sheet Banking Risk 
of Large U.S. Commercial Banks 
M. Kabir Hassan* 
Working Paper # 6-91 
* Assistant Professor of Finance, Department of Economics and 
Finance, University of New Orleans. 
For additional copies of this working paper or a current list of 
the papers available in this Series, please contact: 
Professor Nicholas Mercuro
 
Working Paper Series
 
Department of Economics and Finance
 
University of New Orleans
 
New Orleans, LA 70148
 
phone: (504) 286-6270
 
Not for quotation or attribution without permission of authors. 
All rights reserved. 
COPYRIGHT © 1991 
ABSTRACT
 
Off-Balance Sheet (OBS) activities of large u.S. commercial banks 
have been growing rapidly in recent years. These activities 
represented 58% of total bank assets in 1984 and grew to 176% of 
total bank assets in 1988. Bank regulators are concerned that OBS 
activities increase bank risk, and proposed that some OBS 
activities be included in the calculation of a risk-based capital 
requirement. This paper investigates the impact of OBS activities 
on market measures of risk. specifically, this paper examines the 
risk-reducing diversification and risk-increasing effects of OBS 
activities by employing implied asset variances, in addition to, 
equity and systematic risks as proxies for market measures of bank 
risk. This research contends that asset variance is a better 
measure of risk for regulated banking industry. A Ronn-Verma (JF, 
1986) option pricing methodology is employed to calculate implied 
asset variances. Systematic risk, equity risk and implied asset 
risk are regressed over various measures of OBS items and on­
balance measures of risk in a Pooled Cross-section and Time-series 
sample. The results indicate that OBS activities, in general, 
reduce total risk, but do not affect systematic risk. The 
explanatory powers of the models are improved significantly when 
implied asset variances, instead of equity variances, are used to 
proxy for total risk. Because regulators are concerned with total 
risk and probability of bank failure, the risk-reducing potential 
of OBS activities indicates that additional capital requirement of 
OBS activities will penalize large banks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates the relationship between off-balance sheet 
activities and market risk measures for large U.S. commercial banks. A number 
of competing hypotheses about risk-tlli~ing behavior of OBS items have been 
proposed in literature. This paper examines risk-reducing diversification and 
risk-increasing leverage effects of OBS activities by employing implied asset 
variances from option pricing models, in addition to standard equity and 
systematic risk. Previous literature employed equity risk as a proxy for total 
risk to test the risk-behavior of OilS banking activities. This paper contends 
that equity risk is an inappropriate proxy for total risk for regulated banking 
industry because both stockholders and regulatory agencies bear banking risks 
when such institutions fail. Regulatory agencies bear part of OBS risk because 
bank depositors are protected by de facto deposit insurance. Given the 
contingent claims nature of equity and deposit insurance, implied asset 
variances are calculated employing a Ronn-Verma (JF, 1986) option pricing and 
deposit insurance methodology. Such asset variances are used in a pooled 
cross- section and time- series sample to test the risk- tllidng. behavior of OBS 
, banking risk. 
In recent years co~nercial banks have engaged In activities that do not 
appear on their balance sheets. These Off-balance sheet (henceforth ODS) 
activities are contingent claims or contracts that generate fee income for a 
bank. Hm.'ever, these ODS activities also create balance sheet or portfolio 
risk. A contingent claim involves an obligation to lend or provide funds should 
the contingency be realized. Therefore, it does not create a change in the 
balance sheet until the contingency is realized. While a loan is an asset on a 
bank's balance sheet, a promise to make a loan is a contingent liability which 
creates a potential funding obligation in the future. A bank also has limited 
2
 
control over when its obligation to provide funds will be exercised. As a 
result of its off-balance sheet activity, a bank faces three general types of 
portfolio risk: credit risk on underwritten guarantees, interest rate risk due 
to asset and liability mismatches on commitment takedmms and interest rate 
swaps, and liquidity risk due to the over-extension of obligations. 
Because of financial and technological innovations in the 1970s and 
increased competition in the financial services industry, banks have unbundled 
their traditional banking services, in particular, separating funding of assets 
by deposit liabilities from other services. Depending on the specific bank 
customer, low value- added services (such as bearing interest rate risk) are ." 
de-emphasized and high value-added services (such as underwriting the direct 
placement of debt) are emphasized without impairing the provision of services to 
other bank customers. This unbundling is the primary force behind the 
significant growth in off-balmlce sheet banking activities and fee income as a 
source of profitability, especially at large commercial banks. 
Off-balance sheet activities have been gro,~ing rapidly in recent years. 
Total off-balance items grew from 1.4 trillion dollars in 1984 to 5.7 trillion 
dollars in 1988. Moreover, ODS activities represented 587. of total bank assets 
In 1984 and grew to 1767. of total bank assets in 1988 (Table 1). 
As the volume of off-balance sheet items ,~as increased, bank regulators 
have become concerned that the risks of OBS items could lead to sudden liquidity 
squeezes or surprise losses. Unlike balance-sheet assets, these potential 
obligations are not funded with balance sheet liabilities and not considered In 
determining a bank's regulatory capital requirements. Therefore, conventional 
measures of financial health may not present an accurate picture of a bank's 
condition. This situation is likely to change because the Federal Reserve 
3 
System has proposed supplemental risk-based capital requirements that 
specifically include off-balance sheet items such as loan commitments, standby 
letters of credit, and commercial letters of credit in the calculation of 
minimum acceptable risk capital. l 
To formulate public policy concerning bank use of off-balance sheet items, 
it is necessary to understand the risk embodied in off-balance activities and 
the motivation behind off-balance sheet decisions. Given the recent attention 
paid to bank off-balance sheet activities and their risks, surprisingly little 
has been \"ritten about the measurement of off- balance sheet banking risk. The 
literature on off-balance sheet activities and their risk is limited and, due to 
data availability problems, primarily theoretical. The risk- based capital 
guidelines recently proposed by Federal Reserve explicitly assume that standby 
letters of credit are as risky as loans, commercial letters of credit are as 
risky as municipal security investments, and loan commitments are as risky as 
the sale of federal funds. 'fuether or not such assumpt ions are warranted 
remains an open question. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze and empirically test the effects of 
ODS activities on the risk-taking behavior of commercial banks. Section II 
contains a review of the literature pertinent to the relationships between 
risk-tlli(ing behavior of ODS banking activities. The empirical methodology along 
with hypothesis dealing with ODS banking risk are discussed in Section III. 
Section IV analyzes data and presents the empirical results. A summary of major 
conclusions and policy evaluation appears in Section V. 
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II. OFF-BALANCE ACTIVITIES AND BANK RISK-TAKING BEllAVIOR 
A number of competing hypotheses concerning risk-taking behavior of OBS 
items have been proposed in literature. A bank's activity in the market for 
off-balance sheet credit enhancement is a function of its willingness to 
accommodate the needs of its customers, the market's perception of a bank's 
quality as reflected in balance sheet decisions and the incentives provided by 
the regulators. Theories of financial intermediation suggest that ODS banking 
activities are designed to provide credit enhancement services to its customers. 
By guaranteeing funds availability, the intermediary has an incentive to 
efficiently monitor the borro,{ers, produce information and signal its 
credibility, and specialize in credit evaluation. ODS banking activities thus 
represent substitute methods for allocating credit with complementaries in 
production. The risk-return trade-off between selling information services and 
warehousing assets will induce a bank to divide its business between both 
balance and off-balance sheet finffilcial activities. Therefore, OBS activities 
do not affect fundamental business risk of banking firms. Because part of 
'business risk is diversifiable, the remaining market risk is also unaffected by 
OBS activities. The diversification hypothesis implies that banks engage in OBS 
activities to diversify its asset portfolio in order to achieve within firm 
diversification and to avoid the wrath of disappointed bank shareholders [see 
Diamond (1984), Pavel (1987, 1988)J. This hypothesis suggests a negative 
relationship between total bank risk ffild ODS activities. 
The Leverage Hypothesis states that fixed rate deposit insurance together 
with capital requirements provide incentives to increase financial leverage 
through the issuance of ODS activities that are not subject to capital 
requirements. By increasing financial leverage in this ,{ay, a bank can enhance 
5 
whatever subsidies it receives from deposit insurance. This hypothesis thus 
predicts a positive relationship between total bank risk and OBS activities [see 
Pyle (1985), Benveniste and Berger (1986)]. 
The empirical evidence of the risk-behavior of ODS banking activities is 
inconclusive. Lynge and Lee (1987) found that the coefficients of independent 
variables incorporating OBS banking activities are significantly negative in a 
model explaining total risk, but insignificant in a model explaining systematic 
risk. Brewer, Koppenhaver and Wilson (1986) found that SLCs reduce systematic 
risk but loan commitments and commercial letters of credit do not affect 
systematic risk. Pavel (1987) found that loan sales have little impact on b~k 
risk. Avery and Berger (1988) regressed three bank performance measures against 
OBS activities and found that SLCs are associated with poor bank performance but 
loan commitments are associated with better bank performance. 
The empirical literature of OBS banking risk contains a number of 
limitations, which this research seeks to rectify. By measuring OBS banking 
risk in a more theoretically appealing way, bank regulators and investors can 
gain a better understanding of the size of the risks that are involved and 
policies that might make effective control possible. 
First, this study distinguishes between risk-reducing diversification and 
risk-increasing hypotheses of ODS banking risk. This is important because the 
largely undiversified bank regulators are more concerned with total risk and 
probability of bank failures, and diversified investors are concerned with 
systematic risk. If risk-reducing diversification effect of OBS activities 
dominates risk-increasing effects of OBS activvities, then the risk-adjusted 
capital requirement of ODS banking activities may be inappropriate. 
6 
The empirical research also ignored the impact of regulation on bank risk 
measurement. The equity risk used in previous studies ignores the fact that 
banking is a regulated industry. This research measures risk in such a way that 
incorporates the effect of deposit insurance and the regulatory closure rules. 
A bank's total asset risk, rather than equity risk, explicitly captures the 
impact of deposit insurance because both bank debtholders and equityholders 
benefit from deposit insurance subsidies. 
Second, the leverage and diversification effects of OBS banking risk is 
investigated by measuring asset risk of banks, which is based upon a risk-based 
deposit insurance premium developed by Ronn and Verma (1986). A beta risk model 
IS also used to investigate whether equityholders take into account the effects 
of OBS banking activities. 
Third, this study \~ill employ an extended data set ranging from 1984 to 
1988 and will examine risk behavior of all 19 OilS items from Call and Income 
Report of the FDIC tapes. These OilS b~lking items are grouped into seven 
categories (Oil, SLC, CLC, cmm, PART, S'{AP, OilS) depending upon their similar 
characteristics to investigate their differential impact on bank risk. 
III. HYPOTllESES TESTING AND METllODOLOGY 
3.1 llYPOTllESES TESTING 
The first research question to be investigated is the relationship between 
OBS banking activities and market risk. ilecause theory suggests that OilS 
banking activities are not concern for \iell-diversified investors, the following 
hypothesis is tested to examine the market risk of OilS activities. 
7 
IIypothesis One: OBS banking activities do not affect market risk. 
Total risk can be decomposed into three parts: 
Total risk = market risk + diversifiable risk + financial risk. 
The diversification potential of DOS activities is expected to decrease 
diversifiable risk and the leverage potential of OBS activities is expected to 
increase financial risk. Because leverage potential of OBS activities is 
realized only when such guarantees are exercised, the following hypothesis is 
tested to examine the total risk of OBS activities. 
IIypothesis Two: The diversification effects of IBS activities outweigh 
leverage potentials, and result in a reduction of total risk. 
3.2 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
To test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2, the follO\o/ing tlW accounting- based 
risk models are estimated over cross-section and time-series data using the 
generalized least squares (GLS) technique. The expected signs of partial 
derivatives appear on each independent variable. 
+ + + 
P = f (OBS, LEY, DIY, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, POR) (1) 
+ + + 
~ = f (OBS, LEY, DIY, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE, POR) (2) 
where 
OBS = seven variables constructed from all OBS banking activities included 
in the RC-L schedule of the FDIC tapes; 
LEY = ratio of total liabilities over total assets; 
DIY = an index of diversification of the bank's loan portfolio; 
ALOSS = ratio of loan loss reserves over total assets; 
AGAP = ratio of net position (total market rate assets minus market rate 
liabilities) to total assets; 
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ASIZE = logarithm of assets of banks; 
POR = cash dividends over net income. 
Seven off-balance sheet variables are constructed from the 19 off-balance 
sheet items of the RC-L schedule of bank call and income reports. These 
variables are AOB, ACmlM, APAPT, ASLC, ACLC, AS,,rAP and AOBS and scaled dmm by 
total assets. Since off-balance sheet items constitute a heterogeneous 
collection of participations, commitments, and other arrangements, it is 
difficult to represent the influence of these items in any simple way. These 
independent variables attempt to group items with similar characteristics. 
Similar off-balance sheet groupings are also done by Lynge and Lee (1988). 
These variables are reported in Table 2. LEY, DIY, ALOSS, AGAP, ASIZE and POP 
are proxies for leverage ratio, diversification index, credit risk, interest 
rate risk, operating risk illld dividend payout ratio. These on-bal~lce 
accounting risk variables have also been extensively used in studies of bank 
risk literature. Lee and Bre,.er (1986) used similar variables to investigate 
commercial bank financial policies and their impact on market determined 
measures of risk. The authors found leverage, loan-loss, dividend payout, gap 
variables are significantly related to market measures of risk. Jahankhani and 
Lynge (1980) also used similar variables in their bank risk study and found 
similar results. Pettway (1976) investigated accounting factors affecting total 
risk and systematic risk, llild found that dividend and earnings are significant 
variables. 
Koppenhaver (1987), Pavel (1988), and Pavel and Philis (1987) used a 
diversification index to examine the diversification potential of SLCs and loan 
sales. The higher the diversification index is, the higher the diversification 
potential is in the loan portfolio, and the lm.er the risk is. 
9
 
This research exploits these previously tested accounting risk variables in 
order to examine the principal research questions of the risk-taking behavior of 
off-balance sheet banking activities. All these variables have been normalized 
by total assets in order to eliminate heteroskedasticity problem in the 
statistical estimation. 
The negative sign of DIV variable indicates that diversification by bank 
loan portfolio reduces total risk. The positive sign of LEV variable indicates 
that leverage ratios of banks increase total risk. In addition, the negative 
signs of OBS variables in equation (2) implies that, after controlling for 
on-balance leverage and diversification effects, risk-reducing diversificatio~ 
effect of OBS activities dominates risk-increasing effects of OBS activities. 
Bank risk will be measured three different ways. The first measure of risk 
is the standard deviation of equity return (ROE). The second measure of risk is 
based upon a risk-based deposit insurance premium developed by Ronn and Verma 
(JF, 1986). The third measure of risk is systematic risk and is proxied by 
beta. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The measure of asset risk used in this research is the risk-based deposit 
insurance premium estimated by Ronn and Verma (1986). Ronn and Verma 
demonstrate that empirical estimation of risk and deposit insurance premium is 
tractable when time- series data on the market I s value of bank I s equity and the 
book value of its debt are available. Market perceptions of the FDIC bailout 
policy are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inplied values of 
assets and their volatilities. 
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3.3.2 TIlE VALUATION OF ASSET VARIANCE UNDER DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
Ronn and Verma applies Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model to 
calculate a 'fair' per dollar deposit insurance premium that takes into 
consideration the FDIC's bailout policy. Ronn and Verma (1986) start with the 
following notation: 
V = the unobserved post-insurance value of the bank's assets;
 
B = face value of total debt liabilities;
 
U = the instantaneous standard deviation of the rate of return on the
v 
value of the bank's assets; 
T = time until next audit of bank's assets; 
a= dividend per dollar of value of the assets, paid n times per period. 
Under the assumption of a constant variance for the rate of return on the 
bank's assets, Merton's (1977) insurance premium per dollar of deposits, d, is 
given by 
d = N [Y + U vT] - (1-0)n (V/B) N(Y) (3)
v 
where 
Y = [in {BjV (1-0)n} - u 2T/2] I U vT 
v v 
N(·) is the cumulative density of a standard normal random variable; U is thev 
standard deviation of the rate of return on BUC's assets; T is the time to 
expirat ion, i. e., the time unt il the next audit of the BIIC (assumed to be 1); 
V is the value of the BIlC's assets adjusted for stock-splits and dividends; B is 
the value of the BllC's debt. 
Two variables in the above equation are not empirically observable: V and 
uv. They can, however, be solved for by representing the equity of a bank 
holding company as a call option on the assets of the firm with the same 
i 
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maturity as debt and the striking price equal to the maturity value of the debt 
(Black and Scholes, 1973). 
Ronn and Verma (1986) point out that the FDIC does not liquidate a bank as 
soon as it observes that its net worth is negative. Rather the FDIC tries to 
revive the bank. The FDIC is concerned about containing the disruptive effect 
of an individual bank failure to ensure that it never reaches the magnitude of a 
bank run. These concerns not only have the effect of allowing a bank to operate 
up to a certain point beyond complete erosion of net worth, but also are 
perceived by the market to have such an effect. They assume, however, that some 
hypothetical limit of erosion of value exists such that revival becomes too 
costly. This hypothetical limit can be expressed as a percentage of total debt 
of the bank. This also alters the boundary condition to be applied to the 
equity, construed as a call option. The closure rule is therefore modeled as 
follows: the FDIC liquidates a bank if VT < pO where VT is the terminal value 
of assets at time T and p < = 1 is a policy parameter. Given this modified 
closure rule and the standard options-theoretic relationship between the 
instantaneous variances of the derivative and underlying assets, the equity of 
the bank holding company can be written as: 
E = VN(x) - pBN(x - ~v ~) (4) 
[iN (V/pB) + ~ 2 T/2]
where x = -=-v _ (5)~v If 
E 
~v = ~E VN(x) 
where E is the market price of equity and ~E is the instantaneous standard 
deviation of the return on E. Here equity is a fully dividend-protected call 
because being the recipient of dividends, equity is in fact dividend-protected. 
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Equations (4) and (5) can be solved simultaneously for the tHO unknOlms, V 
and uv' for each observed E and uE' Ronn and Verma show that a p of .97 yields 
an aggregate deposit premium weighted average of about 1/12 percent, the flat 
rate premium. 
3.3.3 REGULATORY CLOSURE RULE AND MATURITY OF DEBT 
The maturity of debt (T) is assumed to be one year in empirical calculation 
of models (4) and (5). The equity value refers to the maturity of debt while 
the deposit insurance refers to periodicity of audit by the insurer. In a 
regulatory environment, the rational investor would link the debt maturity to 
audit periodicity. These tHO maturities cannot be separated in the context of 
banks because insured deposits account for a large part of the bank's debt and 
new deposits made with a bank before the expiration of the insurance are 
automatically covered by the insurance. At audit time, if the FDIC decides to 
dissolve the bank, all depositors are paid off. It is therefore reasonable to 
argue that the time until next audit should be the proper value of maturity 
(assumed to be 1) in both equations (4) and (5). 
3.3.4 CONCLUSION 
The implied variance of bank assets captures the riskiness of a bank and is 
the underlying driving variable in this study. Ronn and Verma (1986) pricing 
equations can be extended in the context of OBS banking activities by including 
OBS items into total debt because not all risks assumed by a bank appear on its 
book. The implied variances Hill be regressed over bank on-balance and 
off-balance sheet activities to test for their risk-taking potential. 
i 
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IV. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section presents the data, provides empirical estimation of the 
effects of off-balance and on-balance sheet items on the three market measures 
of risk of commerical banks and analyzes the empirical results. 
4.1 DATA ANALYSIS 
Extensive data on bank off-balance sheet activities (ODS) are available 
beginning in 1984. The initial sample utilized in this study consists of the 
100 largest banks based on asset size which have continuous data over the years 
1984 through 1988. ~Iarket values of equity (EQUITY) for each bank or bank 
holding company are collected from CmIPUSTAT yearly tapes. Daily bank stock 
returns and market returns are gathered from the CRSP and the NASDAQ daily 
tapes. Data on off-balllilce sheet items are taken from the FDIC Call and Income 
Reports for the lead bank of the holding company. The sample is restricted to 
those bank holding companies (DnC) whose lead bank accounts for the majority of 
consolidated holding company assets. The accounting risk variables defined in 
the previous section (LEV, DIV, AGAP, ALOSS, POR and ASIZE) are constructed from 
data collected from the FDIC yearly tapes. Data from the FDIC tapes, the 
COMPUSTAT tapes, the CRSP tapes and the NASDAQ tapes are merged together, and 
this resulted in a final sample of 32 banks and bank holding companies for 1984 
through 1988. The relative size of market risk measures, accounting risk 
measures and ODS variables are shOlm in Table 3. 
4.2 CALCULATION OF MARKET MEASURES OF RISK 
Equity risk is proxied by the standard deviat ion of equity return. SImIAE 
IS the annualized standard deviation of daily equity return. SImlAEs are 
calculated for those bank holding companies for which 200 or more trading days 
are available on CRSP and NASDAQ tapes. It can be noted that only 63 bank 
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holding companies have equity return available on CRSP tape and 82 fiIlCs have 
similar data available from the NASDAQ tape. 
BETAs are calculated from daily equity returns for each bank holding 
company for which 200 or more trading days are available from the CRSP and the 
NASDAQ TAPES. The standard market model is used in this study to estimate betas 
and the market index used is equally-weighted market index. Hence, these beta 
estimates are different from Scholes-Williams betas reported in the new CRSP 
tapes. Scholes and Williams (1977) calculated betas from nonsynchronous data 
using a methodology different from market model methodology. 
SImlA1 is defined as the standard deviation of asset return and is 
calculated for each BIlC for each year 1984 through 1988 using the RONN-VERMA 
option pricing methodology. A system of tl.O non-linear simultaneous equations 
(equations (4) and (5) in Section 4) are solved for two unknowns, asset value 
(V) and the standard deviation of asset return (SIGMA1), by a numerical routine 
for each observed yearly EQUITY and annualized standard deviation of equity 
return (SIG~IAE). A subroutine, NEQNF, in the International Mathematical and 
Statistical Library (IMSL) is used to solve the simultaneous equation system. 
The initial estimates used for the value, V, was the sum of the market value of 
equity and book value of debt, I.hile that for qv was qE scaled down by the 
leverage ratio. The cumulative normal distribution function is calculated by 
using a polynomial approximation developed by Cox and Rubinstein (1985). Total 
liabilities, instead of insured debt liabilities, of fiilCs are used for B In 
equations (4) and (5). This may be justified for two reasons. First, existing 
FDIC purchase and assumption policies extend, at least for larger banks, defacto 
i 
15
 
insurance to all liabilities of an insured bank. Second, all debt is of equal 
seniority at time of bank closure. 
SlGMA2 is calculated in the same way as SIGMA1, except that the leverage 
ratio is augmented by OBS debt. The mean value of SIG~U2 is smaller than that 
of SIGMA1. This can be explained by the call feature of equity value. As the 
face value of debt is augmented by OBS items, the value of equity decreases at 
the closure date. Because the call value is directly related to asset variance, 
a 100.,rer asset variance is associated with a decreased call value. 
4.3 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Table 4 presents estimates of explanatory variables using BETA as the 
dependent variable. The estimated coefficients of all OBS items have expected 
negative signs, and all but one are not statistically significant. These 
results suggest that most OBS activities have no effect on systematic bank risk. 
The results are consistent \,:ith Pettway (1976) and Lynge and Lee (1987). 
Standby Letters of Credit (ASLC) is significantly negative at the 57. level, 
implying that well-diversified investors price this banking activity as 
risk- reducing. This result validates a similar finding by Brewer, Koppenhaver 
and Wilson (1986) that equity market prices Standby Letters of Credit (ASLC) as 
risk reducing. 
The coefficients Oil the on-balance measures of risk have expected signs. 
Leverage (LEY) is significantly positive at the 17. level and Diversification 
(DIY) is significantly negative also at the 17. level. Credit Risk (ALOSS) is 
also significantly positive at the 17. level. Dividend payout ratio (POR) is not 
statistically significant. Although interest rate risk and size (GAP and ASIZE) 
have the wrong signs, but they are not statistically significant. 
16 
Table 5 presents estimates of the explanatory variables using standard 
deviation of equity return (SIG~[AE) as the dependent variable. The off-balance 
sheet variables are grouped into seven classes according to their similar 
characteristics as set forth in the previous section. All off-balance sheet 
variables possess negative coefficients. One of these coefficients is 
significant at the 17. level (ASLC), four are significant at the 57. level (AOB, 
ACOMM, AACLC, AOBS) and one is significant at the 17. level (ASl{AP). The 
coefficient of APART is not significantly different from zero. These results 
suggest that at least some of the off-balance sheet variables are risk-reducing. 
These results support the findings of Lynge and Lee (1987) that off- balance __ 
sheet items reduce total risk. 
The hypothesis that risk-reducing diversification potential of OBS items 
dominates the risk-increasing potential of OBS items can be tested by comparing 
the estimated coefficient signs of leverage and diversification (LEV and DIV) 
variables. The significant negative sign of diversification coefficient (DIV) 
indicates an inverse relationship betl1een diversification and risk. Therefore, 
banks can achieve higher level of diversification by engaging In off-balance 
sheet activities and consequently reduce risk. The coefficients of LEV and DIV 
possess expected signs. The significant positive coefficient of leverage (LEV) 
variable indicates a direct relationship between leverage employed and risk. 
Therefore, banks can increase leverage by engaging in off-balance sheet 
activities and consequently increase risk. Given that leverage and 
diversification variables are on-balance sheet measures, the significant 
negative coefficients of some off-balance sheet items, therefore, imply that 
diversification potential of OBS items dominates leverage potential after 
17 
accounting for such effects by on-balance sheet variables, and hence result in 
an overall reduction of risk. 
The credit risk and dividend payout ratio (ALOSS and POR) variables have 
the expected positive and negative signs respectively, and are statistically 
significant. The positive coefficient of credit risk (ALOSS) variable indicates 
a direct relationship between customer default-risk and overall riskiness of 
banks. The n~gative coefficient of dividend payout ratio (POR) variable implies 
an inverse relationship bet\1een bank risk and dividend payout ratio. The size 
(ASIZE) variable has an unexpected positive coefficient; but here size (ASIZE) 
is also highly correlated with off-balance measures of risk, perhaps pointing .. 
towards a simultaneity between size and off-balance sheet items. These results 
are, however, consistent with previous studies of market-determined and 
accounting-determined measures of bank risk variables (Pettway, 1976). 
Models using the total risk (SIGMAE) as the dependent variables have higher 
average R2 compared to models using systematic risk (BETA) as the dependent 
variables (.18 versus .14). The fact that on-balance and off-balance measures 
of risk explain a larger portion of total risk than systematic risk is not 
surprising. Total risk includes both systematic risk and specific risk. 
Certain diversifiable accounting measures of risk such as credit risk (ALOSS) 
are expected to affect mostly specific risk rather than systematic risk. 
Table 6 presents estimates of explllilatory variables using SIG~L~l as the 
dependent variable. SIGMA1 is the standard deviation of asset return calculated 
from Ronn-Verma option pricing methodology. All but one of the estimated 
coefficient of on-balance measures of risk have the expected signs. Leverage, 
diversification, credit risk and size (LEV, DIV, ALOSS and ASIZE) are 
statistically significant at the 17. level. Dividend payout ratio (POR) is not 
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statistically significant. These results again are consistent "ith previous 
studies. 
The coefficients of four off-balance sheet variables (AOB, ACO~aI, APART and 
ASWAP) have unexpected positive signs but they are not statistically 
significant. The coefficients of tHO off-balance sheet variables (ASLC and 
ACLC) are significantly negative at the 5% and 17. levels respectively. It 
appears that risk-reducing diversification effects of Standby Letters of Credit 
(ASLC) and Commercial Letters of Credit (ACLC) dominate risk-increasing effects 
Hhen SIGMAl is used as the market measure of risk. The coefficient of total 
off- balance sheet items (AOBS) is, hOl~ever, signif icantly positive at the 57. 
level. Therefore, it appears that total off-balance sheet items (AOBS) variable 
is risk-increasing Hith this particular risk measure. 
Table 7 presents estimates of explanatory variables using SIGMA2 as the 
dependent variable. SImlA2 measures standard deviation of asset return from 
Ronn- Verma option pricing model \~hen the leverage variable is increased by OBS 
variable. All but ti~O coefficients of on-balance measures of risk have their 
expected signs. Leverage (LEV) is significantly positive at the 17. level. Size 
(ASIZE) is significantly negative at the 17. level. Interest rate risk and 
credit risk (AGAP and ALOSS) variables have unexpected negative signs but they 
are not significant. 
All coefficients of off-balance measures of risk have expected negative 
signs and Commercial Letters of Credit (CLC) is significant at the 57. level. 
Both measures of asset variances (SImIAl and SImIA2) yield superior results 
compared to equity variance (SIG~L\E). When equity variance (SImlAE) is used as 
the Market measure of risk, the on and off-balance financial ratios explains 
about 287. of the variability In total risk among the sample banks. When asset 
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variances are used as the risk measures: on and off-balance measures of risk 
explain about 43% of the variability of asset variances. These results suggest 
that asset variance is superior to equity variance in proxying total risk. In 
addition, financial variables correlate better with asset variances than equity 
variances as is evidenced by significant improvement in F- statistics (8.42 
versus 15.90). 
v. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY EVALUATIONS 
The purpose of this paper has been mainly to exaUllne the relationship 
between off-balance sheet activities and market measures of risk for large 
commercial banks. The risk-reducing diversification and risk-increasing 
hypotheses of OBS banking risk have been examined In this paper. Implied asset 
variances from option pricing models, in addition to standard equity risk and 
systematic risk, have been used to test the risk-reducing potential of OBS 
banking activities. 
The theoretical analysis of OBS banking activities suggests that OBS 
activities provide diversification benefits to bank-stockholders, and at the 
same time, increase financial risk by augmenting leverage. The risk-based 
capital requirements of OBS items implicitly assumes that OBS activities are 
risk- increasing. \{hether OBS banking activities increase or decrease risk is an 
empirical question. 
A Ronn-Verma (1986) methodology has been employed to calculate implied 
asset variances from option pricing models. Previous studies of OBS banking 
risk have focused on systematic and equity risk and hence did not explicitly 
incorporate the impact of regulation on bank risk measurement. Flat deposit 
insurance premium makes deposits equally risk-free across banks. This explicit 
20 
pricing structure encourages moral hazard behavior because there is no explicit 
penalty in the form of higher insurance premiums for excess risk-taking. Under 
this scheme, high-risk banks are subsidized by low-risk banks. To discourage 
excessive risk-taking and to price its insurance contract more fairly, the FDIC 
uses regulatory interferences to extract implicit premiums from high-risk banks. 
Usually, the regulators impose asset and capital regulation, by requiring banks 
to limit portfolio risk or calling for an infusion of capital. 
Ronn-Verma (1986) point out that FDIC does not close a bank as soon as it 
observes that its net Iwrth is negat i ve. They argue that there is a 
hypothetical limit, expressed as a percentage of total debt, beyond which 
revival of a bank becomes too costly and closes the bank. Otherwise, the FDIC 
calls for an infusion of additional capital. The isomorphic relationship 
between equity as a call option, modified to build into it the market's 
perception of the implementation of closure rule, can be used to invert market 
prices of equity for asset values and variances. These asset variances 
incorporate the impact of deposit insurance and regulatory closure rules 
explicitly. Therefore, asset variances are better than equity variances In 
proxying total risk in the regulated banking industry. 
A pooled cross-section and time-series model, instead of simple OL8, was 
employed to perform the econometric analysis for tlVO reasons. First, 
cross- section or time- series data alone (32 cross- sections and 5 time- periods) 
are not sufficient to extract enough degrees of freedom in regression analysis. 
Second, cross-sections and time-series relationships of OilS banking decisions 
are better captured by a pooled cross- section and time- series model. 
The major empirical findings of this study can be summarized as follows. 
First, test results support the hypothesis that risk-reducing diversification 
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effects of OBS banking items dominate risk increasing effects of OilS banking 
items, thus reducing overall riskiness of banks. Second, the results also 
validate the hypothesis that ODS banking items do not affect systematic risk. 
Only Standby Letters of Credit reduce systematic risk. Third, all seven 
off-balance measures of risk in this study are risk-reducing depending on proxy 
used for total risk. T\w off- balance sheet items (ADS, ACLC, and ASLC) are 
always risk-reducing regardless of the proxy used for total risk. 
Fourth, the explanatory pm.'ers of the models are improved significantly 
\.'hen implied asset variances, instead of equity variances, are used to proxy for 
total risk. This is evidenced by significant increase in R2. These results 
provide credence to the argument that implied asset variances are better 
measures of total market risk for regulated banking industry. Fifth, several 
on- balance measures of accounting risk also shm.' statistically significant 
correlations with market measures of risk. Finally, pooled cross-section and 
time-series analysis of ODS banking risk provides better coefficient estimates 
(increased t-statistics) and increases the statistical significance of models 
(increased F-statistics). 
The existing policy proposal to regulate ODS banking risk by bringing them 
into a risk-based capital requirement can be analyzed in the light of empirical 
findings of this research. The results indicate that off-balance sheet 
activities, in general, reduce total risk, but do not affect systematic risk, 
implying that off- balance sheet risk is not a concern of well- diversified 
stockholders. '{hile bank regulators are concerned with total risk and the 
probability of bank failures, the risk reducing potential of OilS activities 
indicates that additional capital requirement of OBS banking activities will 
penalize large banks. 
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'fAilLE 1 
AGGREGATE VOLD1lE OF OFF- I3.\U~CE- SilEET COmUD1ENTS AND CONTIi\GENCIES 
U. S. COmlERCIAL BANKS
 
ANNUAL DATA AS OF DECEJlI3ER, IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
 
1984 
Commitments to Lend 495.6 
Futures and fonmrd contracts (exclude FX) 
Commitments to buy 40 
Commitments to sell 28.3 
When issued securities 
Commitments to buy 4.3 
Commitments to sell 3.5 
Standby contracts &other option contracts 
Obligations to buy under option contracts 2.8 
Obligations to sell under option 
contracts 1.7 
Commitments to buy FX (incl. $US) , spot
&forward 584 
Standby L/C and foreign office guarantees 
To U.S. addressees 109.8 
To Non-U.S. addressees 34 
(Amount of these items sold to others 
via participations) 15 
Commercial LIC 30 
Participations in acceptances sold to 
others 8.4 
Participations in acceptances bought 
from others 1.5 
Securities borrm.ed 2.7 
Securities lent 2.2 
Other significant commitments & 
contingencies 24.5 
1985 
542.4 
57.2 
40.5 
4.4 
3.3 
10.7 
5 
735.2 
134.8 
38.2 
18.2 
28.4 
8.4 
0.9 
3.5 
3.1 
57.7 
1986 1987 1988 
570.4 611.6 654.9 
99.7 122.7 174.3 
79.6 137.6 234.4 
9.8 2 6.8 
6.2 2.1 6.6 
27.8 48.9 67.3 
11.8 16.4 29.4 
890.8 1,504.1 1;683.2 
132.1 134.5 135.6 
35.8 33.7 33.2 
18.5 19.6 19.2 
28.4 30.5 30.2 
5.4 4.2 3.9 
0.8 1.5 0.5 
5.4 5.9 6.7 
4 4.5 3.9 
70.5 84.3 128.1 
Table 1, continued 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Jlemoranda: 
Loans originated &sold during period 
ending this quarter 50.1 75.6 107.7 192.1 280.4 
Loans purchased during period ending 
this quarter nla nla nla 15.7 18.7 
Notational value of all outstanding 
interest rate swaps nla 186.1 366.6 714.9 928.6 
Mortgages sold, with recourse 
FNMA &FHLMC residential mortgage loan pools 
DIS principal bal. of mortgages sold 
or s,mpped n/a nla nla nla nla 
Amount of recourse exposure on these 
mortgages nla nla nla nla nla 
Private residential mortgage loans nla n/a n/a n/a n/a
DIS principal bal. of mortgages sold n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Amount of recourse exposure on these 
mortgages n/a n/a n/a n/a nla 
Farmer Mac agricultural mortgage loan pools 
DIS principal bal. of mortgages sold nla n/a n/a nla nla 
Amount of recourse exposure on these 
mortgages n/a nla nla nla nla 
Total, excluding memoranda items 1,438.4 1,953.6 2.471.3 3,686.8 4,445.9 
Total assets (on-balance-sheet items) 2,492.5 2,707.6 2,907.5 2,955.2 3,064.2 
Source: Call Reports (OCC, Ogilvie, October 1990). 
Notes: 
1. FX = foreign exchange
2. LIC = Letter of credit 
3. DIS principal bal. = outstanding principal balance 
Table 2 
OBS Items (Schedule RC-L Off-Balance Sheet Variables) 
1. Securities borrowed 
2. Securities lent 
3. Cooonitments to purchase when issued securities 
4. Commitments to sell when issued securities 
5. Notational value of interest rate swaps 
6. SLC to U.S. addresses 
7. SLC to non U.S. addresses 
8. SLC participated to others 
9. Commercial letters of credit 
10. Commitments to purchase foreign currencies 
11. Unused loan commitments 
12. Commitments to purchase futures and fon-lard contracts 
13. Commitments to sell futures and forward contracts 
14. Obligation to purchase under option contracts 
15. Obligations to sell under options contract 
16. Participations In acceptances conveyed to others 
17. Participations In acceptances conveyed from others 
18. Other significant commitments or contingencies 
19. Loan sold or participated to others 
The off- balance sheet variables consist of the follO\-ling items: 
DB = 3+6+7-8-9+10+11 
CO~aI = 12+13+14+15+18 
PART = 8+16+17+19 
S,,rAP = 5 
SLC = 6+7-8 
CLC = 9 
OBS = DB + COmI + PART + S'HP + SLC + CLC 
Table 3
 
Summary Statistics for Accounting Risk Variables,
 
Off- Balance Sheet Variables and ~rarl\et Measures of Risk Variablesa 
Variable 
Systematic Risk 
Equity Risk 
Asset Risk (RV) 
Asset Risk (RV) 
Off-balance sheet groups 
Commitments 
Participations 
National Value of S\~aps 
Commercial Letters of Credit 
Standby Letters of Credit 
Total Off- Balance Items 
Financial Leverage 
Diversification Index 
Credit Risk 
Interest Rate Risk 
Dividend Payout Ratio 
Logarithm of Assets 
Standard 
Svmhol Mean Deviation 
BETA .85337 .40162 
SImrAE .01828 .01124 
SImrA 1 .00155 .00179 
SIG:lL\ 2 .00065 .00208 
AOn .97779 .94551 
ACOmr .16469 .24067 . 
APART .09618 .27160 
ASIUP .32129 .52079 
ACLC .01523 .01095 
ASLC .07394 .04687 
AOBS 1. 58013 1.69662 
LEV .94938 .01317 
DIV 1. 74527 .67445 
ALOSS .01341 .00956 
AGAP .05955 .13878 
POR .50910 .74757 
ASIZE 16.65717 .99929 
a For a sample of 32 commercial banks and bank holding companies over 
1984-1988 periods. 
TABLE 4 
Pooled Crou-Sectlon and Tllle-Serl .. A..uHs 
(Oependent Variable: BElA) 
Equa t JOn' 
.lo. Con"'n< 
10.58 
(4.18)'" 
AQ!! _ 
-.008 
(-.19) 
ACOtiN APART .'I-C ACIC ASIIAP .08S I~V 
10.64 
(4.H)"· 
DIy 
-.09 .. •• 
(-2.55)'" 
INP 
-.00003 
(-.05) 
HJlSS 
9.32 
(l.a9)"· 
PO! 
-.0048 
(-.70) 
ASIZE 
.024 
(-.67) 
i 2 
• 14 
F(8~_)_ 
3.58 u • 
10.29 
(4.6))'" 
--­ -.067 
(-.56) 
10.37 
(4.61)'" 
-0.082 
(-2.41)'" 
-.000002 
(-.003) 
9.36 
(l.SO)"· 
-.0046 
(-.68) 
.025 
(.86) 
.13 ,:28 aU 
3. 10.54 
(4.16)'" 
-­ -
-.02 
(-.16) 
lO.n 
(4.75)'" 
-.087 
(-2.55)'" 
-.00002 
(-.045) 
9.18 
(3.48) ... 
-.0047 
(-.68) 
-.021 
(-.78) 
• 14 3.S4 ... 
9 .14 
(4.12)'" 
-1.10 
(-1.68) .. 
9.60 
U.26)"· 
-:09 
(-2.60)'" 
-.00005 
(-.08) 
9.88 
(3.64)'" 
-.004 
(-.58) 
.057 
(1.5))' 
.12 2.95 "111 
10.51 
(4.80)'" 
.82 
(.44) 
10.52 
(4. ]4)'" 
-.09 
(-2.73)'" 
-.00002 
(-.02) 
9.06 
(3.46)'" 
-.004 
(-.68) 
.011 
(.12) 
• 15 3.88 :.... 
10.42 
(4.68)'" 
.06 
( 1.08) 
10.12 
(4.44)'" 
-.08 
(...,2.37)'" 
-.00006 
(-.08) 
7.84 
(2.72)0" 
-.004 
(,08) 
.005 
(.16) 
.15 3.94 dIU 
10.60 
(4.19) ... 
-.002 
(-.OJ) 
lO.SI 
(4.65)'" 
-.088 
(-2.50)'" 
-.00005 
(-.OJ) 
8.95 
(l.13)"· 
-.004 
(-.69) 
.01S 
(.44) 
• 15 3.54 .It • 
NOTES: I) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
BfTA Is tho syste.attc risk; 
ADO, ACOIil, APART, ASLC, ACLC, ,I,SIIAP ond ADOS reprennt nven 
off-balanco sheet variables; 
LEV, OIV, ,I,CAP, ,I,LOSS, POA and ASIZE repre ..nt flnanchl lover­
ago, dtve .. lflcotlon Index, Interut rate risk, credit risk, 
dIvIdend payout and logarithm of IIsets rupectlvely; 
lIumbe.. In lho par.nth.... are t-statlstlcs; 
SIgnifIcance level: '. 101:; •• c 5X; ... c IX. 
TABLE 5 
Pooled Crou-Sectlon .nd TIlle-SerIes Result. 
(Oependent Vorl.ble: SIGHAE) 
£quol t (ani 
Ho, CUll..... 
,II 
0.31)" 
A0ti 
-,0015 
(-2.06)" 
ACl»IM 
-­
APAMT 
--­
ASI.C 
-­
ACI.C 
-­
AS,,!r 
---
AOtiS 
--­
LEY 
.13 
(2,14)'" 
DIY 
-,0011 
(-I, 18)" 
/fAr 
-,00001 
(-1,42)' 
"'"SS 
,34 
15.40)'" 
fOB 
-,00001 
(-1,4))' 
AsrzE 
.0018 
(2,49)'" 
i 1 
.11 
f(8,IH) 
.8.12 u, 
.Il 
(2,90)'" -­
-.OOS 
(-1.9))" 
-­ -­ - --­ -­
.14 
0.15)'" 
-,OOIS 
(-1,61)' 
-.00001 
(-1.80)' 
,31 
(S.Il)·" 
-,00008 
(-1.48)'" 
,,0014 
(1.10)" 
•30 .9.28 ... 
.12 
(2.53)'" 
--­
-­
-.0022 
(-I, II) 
-­ -­ --­ -­ ,13 
(1.6))'" 
-,OOIS 
(-1,53)' 
-.00001' 
(-1,55)' 
,28 
(4 .8S)"· 
-.00009 
(-2.01)" 
,0011 
(2.53)'" 
.23 6.41 ... 
.OS2 
(.9S) 
--­ -­ --­
-0.01 
(-4.IS)·" 
--­ --­ --­ .086 
(1,61)" 
-.0022 
(-2,32)'" 
-.00001 
(-2,01)" 
.31 
(S.34)"· 
-.00004 
(-I,S))' 
,0033 
0,97)'" 
.3S :11.14· .. • 
.10 
(2.30)" -­
- - - -.061 
(-I,6S)" 
-­ -­ .11 
(2.48)'" 
-,0009 
(-,9S) 
-,00001 
(-1.66)" 
,16 
(4.66)'" 
-,00001 
(-1.16)" 
•001 
(1.19)" 
.21 1.91 ... 
.14 
(2.96)'" 
--­ -­ -­ -­
-­
-.0026 
(-I.S6)· 
-­ .IS 
0.10)'" 
-.0018 
(-I, 90)" 
-.00001 
(-1,60) • 
.33 
(4,18)'" 
-,00009 
(-1.00)" 
,0013 
(2.00)" 
,26 '1.44· .... 
,13 
(2, ))) ... -­ - -­ -­ -­ -­ -.001 (-2.16)" 
,IS 
0,11)'" 
-.0018 
(-1,86)" 
-.00001 
(I,SI)' 
,36 
(S,S6)'" 
-.00001 
(-1,4))' 
.0019 
(1.$1)'" 
,21 .1.98-"· 
HOTES: I) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
SIGMAE Is th. annu.llred .l.nd.rd devlltlon of aqulty return.; 
ADO, ACl»'oH, APART, ASLC, ACLC, ASWAP .nd AOUS repre.enl .even 
ott-b.lanc• •heel vorllblo.; 
LEV, OIV. AGAP, AlOSS. POR and ASIZE repre ..nt tln.nclll lever­
.ge, dlverittlc.tlon Indu, tnlerest r.le risk, credit rllk, 
dIvidend p.youl .nd 10gorl1l1l1 at u.et. re.pecllvely; 
Humll." In lh. por.nlh.... or. l-Illllstlc.; 
Slgnlflc.nce level: • a lOX; •• = 5X; ... = IX. 
'1 
TABLE 6 
Pooled Crou-Socllon And TI~e-Serlu Ruult5 
(Dependent VorlAble: SIOOI) 
£quMllon. 
Ho, COnl5lanC hOU ACOItH APART ASI£ ACl.C ASWAP AQUS LEV DIV IfAP ROSS fOR ASTlE .2 f(8, Ill) 
.041 .00008 
-
- - - - -
.013 -.00023 -.000903 .023 -,000004 -.0006 .43 16.32·" (6,49)'" (.81) (4,89)'" (-1.11)'" (-1.13)" (2,74) ... (-,71) (-6,83) .., 
,044 
(6,98) .. , -­ .0001 (,48) --­ --­ --­ --­ --­ .035 (5.23)'" 
-.9003 
(-2.68)'" 
-.000002 
(-1.64)' 
.013 
(4.61)'" 
-.0000005 
(-.09) 
-,ODDS 
(-6.40)'" 
,41 ,"15.02 AU 
,043 
(6.63)'" 
-­
-­
.• 0001 
(.80) 
-­ --­ --­ -­ ,034 
<5.10)'" 
-.0002 
(-2.34)'" 
-.000003 
(-2.04)" 
,015 
Cl.64)·" 
-,000004 
(-.68) 
-.090S 
(-9.07)'" 
•44 17.26 ... 
.041 
(5. 9P)'" 
-­ -­ -­
-,003 
(-1.53)' 
-­
-­ -­
,036 
(5.01)'" 
-,0003 
(-3.17) ... 
-,090003 
(-1.92)" 
,027 
0,63)'" 
-,000002 
(-,28) 
-,0004 
(-3,52)'" 
,41 16.21 ... 
.040 
(5.91)'" 
- -
-­ -
-.023 
(-3.61)'" -­
-­ .033 
(4.64) ... 
-,0002 
(-I. 76)" 
-,000002 
(-1,50)' 
,032 
(5.00)'" 
-.0000004 
(-,08) 
-.0004 
(-5.36)'" 
,41 15.06·· .. 
,042 
(6.32)'" 
--­ - - - -­
,0002 
(1,22) -
.013 
(4,701'" 
-,0002 
(-2.21)" 
-.000003 
(-2.06)" 
,021 
(2.28)" 
-,000003 
(-.64) 
.,.0005 
(-7.78)'" 
.42 IS.Ol. AU 
(.042)' -­
-­ -­ -­ -­ --­
.00006 .032 -.0002 
-.000003 ,020 -.000004 -.00062 ,43 16.)) ... A 
(6.55)'" (1.31)' (4,79)'" (-2.11)" (-2.15)" (2.34)'" (-.82) (-1.39) , .. 
NOTES: I) SIOOI II th••nnu.lll.d slendard devlallon of uut return, 
calcuhled froOl Ronn-V.....a (1986) optIon pricIng Olothodology; 
2) AOO, AC~, APART, ASlC, AClC, ASIIAP And ADOS repres.nt ,even 
ott-bahnc. sheet v.rhbles; 
3) lEV, DIV, AliAP, AlOSS, POR and ASIlE repr..ent flnanchl levor­
.g., dlvA.,tflcatlon Index, Inlerut rate rhk, cr.dlt risk. 
divIdend payout and logarithm of auets r.spectlv.ly; 
4) Numbers In th. par.nth.... or. t-stdhllcs; 
5) SignifIcance lev.l: ': 10%; .. c SX; ... c 1%. 
TABLE 7 
Poohd Cro ..-S.ctlon .nd TIIl.-S.rles R.,ult. 
(O.p.ndenl Varhbl.: 5(002) 
Equ",c ton. 
110, Con,unt AOU ACOHM APART Mite ACI.C ASWAP AOUS lEV DIy Ifhf N.Oss POI\ ASIZE 
-2 
• F(8, 1S2) 
.021 -.00004 
--­ -­ -­ --­ -­ -­
.018 -.0001l -.000001 -.0019 -.000004 -.0004 .30 9.50 UA 
(4.10)'" (-.36) . 0.29) ... (-1.05) (-1.22) (-.29) (-.41) (-3.39)'" 
.023 
--­
-.00003 
-­ -­ --­ --­ --­ .01S -.00009 -.000001 . T.00S4 -.000006 -.0004 .29 8.68 Uill (4.26) ... (-.08) (2.91)'" (-.15) (-1.11) (-.76) (-.86) (-4.09)'" 
.025 
--­
-­
-.00008 
- -
--­ -­ .017 -.00008 -.000001 -.OOll -.000004 -.00041 • 34 10.81 .... (5.41)'" (-.43) (3.95).... (-.74) (-1.08) (-.64) (-.48) (-4.81)'" 
.024 
- - -­
-.0013 
- -­ -
.016 -.00012 -.000001 -.0034 -.000002 -.00048 .30 :9.12·" 
0.80) ... (-.53) 0.63)'" (-.99) (-1.13) (..... 62) (-.26) (-3.57)'" 
.026 
(5.05)'" 
--­ -­ --­ -­
-.Oll 
(-2.22)" 
-­ .018 
0.10) ... 
-.00001 
(-.61) 
-.000002 
(-1.96)'" 
-.004 
(-.80) 
-.000003 
(-.43) 
-.00041 
(-4.03)'" 
.32 10.24 u* 
.024 
(4.50)'" -
--­
-­ - --­
-.00002 
(-.13) 
- .016 
0.04) ... 
-.00011 
(-.93) 
-.000001 
(-1.11) 
-.005 
(-.62) 
-.000004 
(-.52) 
-.00043 
(-3.96)'" 
.31 ·9.10·'· 
.025 
(4.56)'" 
-
-­ -­ - -­ -
-.00003 
(-.48) 
'.018 
(3,09)'" 
-.0001l 
(-1.03) 
T.OOOOOI 
(-1.09) 
. -.OOIS 
(-.19) 
-.000003 
(-.34) 
-.00041 
(-3.27)'" 
.31 9.81· tI** 
HOTES: I) 51002" lh. annualll.d 'landard d.vlallon of a... l r.lurn, 
calcuhted fro. Ron-Ven.. (1986) opllon pricing •• lhodology wh.n 
lhe on-b. hnc. debt I. augm.nted by off-b. lanco d.bt; 
-2) AOB, ACOOK, APART, ASlC, AClC, 
off-b.hnc••h•• t varl.bles. 
ASWAP and ADOS r.pr•••nl sev.n 
3) LEV, OIV, MAP, AIOSS, POR and ASIZE r.present financial hv.r­
ag., dlvenUtcatlon Inde., Inlerest r.l. risk, cr.dlt risk, 
4l 
5 
dlvld.nd payout .nd logarithm of .... ls respectlv.ly; 
Humb.rs In th. par.nlh.ses ar. t-slatlstlcs; 
Slgnlflcanc. l.v.l: • ~ lOX; •• ~ 5:1:, ... ~ 1:1:. 
ENDNOTE
 
iOn March 1, 1988, the Federal Reserve, In conjunction with other bank 
regulatory agencies and foreign central banks, issued a risk-based capital 
proposal. This proposal, which would be phased in by 1992, would replace 
current standards that require U.S. banks and bank holding companies to hold a 
flat percentage of capital against all balance sheet assets. The principal 
changes embodied in the risk-based capital proposal are that (1) different types 
of assets would receive different risk \~eights according to their perceived 
riskiness, (2) some off-balance sheet items would also be weighted and added to 
risk-weighted assets, and (3) banks from 12 participating countries would, for 
the first time, be subject to a common minimum capital standard. 
In these proposed guidelines, supplemental capital ratios are to be 
calculated that explicitly incluue stand.by and commercial letters of credit, and 
loan commitments. Loan commitments are in the money market risk category 
(weight = 30'7.), commercial letters of credit are in the moderate risk category 
(l.;eight = 607.), and standby letters of credit are in either the moderate risk 
category or the standard risk category (lieight = 1007.) depending on their 
reasons for issuance. The lieights determine the quantity of each item that is 
included in risk assets and then compared to primary capital. 
